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RECENT DECISIONS
Administrative Law -

Revocation of License

-

Due

Process
Plaintiff-licensee had been conducting a business of wholesaling
cigarettes without the required meter impression, in violation of
Tex. Tax-Gen. art. 7.21.1 On account of these illegal operations
and without notice or hearing, the state comptroller notified the
plaintiff that its permit to sell cigarettes had been forfeited. The
plaintiff sought to enjoin the cancellation of the permit. The trial
court denied the application for a temporary injunction, sustaining
the comptroller's action. The court of civil appeals affirmed on the
ground that article 7.21 did not expressly provide for notice or hearing, and that the plaintiff in fact was given a hearing in the trial
court on its application for an injunction. Held, reversed: A permit
to sell cigarettes is a privilege which, once it has been granted, is a
valuable right which cannot be revoked without adequate notice and
hearing preceding the final administrative order. House of Tobacco,

Inc. v. Robert S. Calvert, Comptroller, 394 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1965).
It is well settled that constitutional due process requires that an
individual be given adequate notice and hearing before any property
right is taken from him by governmental action. Under the doctrine
of privilege, however, an individual is not afforded the same protection when there is a privilege involved as distinguished from a
property right.! Privileges are those activities which the state can
deny if it so chooses, while rights are those activities which a state
cannot deny completely but can only regulate.' The majority of jurisdictions have accepted the general rule that a privilege granted under
the police power of the state can be revoked at any time without
notice or hearing because it is not considered to be a property right
in the constitutional sense.' The Texas courts, as well as the majority
of other jurisdictions, have confused matters by adopting the rule
that some privileges once acquired become valuable "rights," protected by the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions
' Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 7.21 (1959).
'For a general discussion of the doctrine of privilege, see 1 Davis, Administrative Law
§ 7.19, at 505-506 and § 7.11, at 452-455 (1958).
3 Ibid.
4 Gillaspie v. Department of Public Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177 (1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 625 (1954).
'Francisco v. Board of Dental Examiners, 149 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error
ref.
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It is not clear what standards the courts use in determining whether
a privilege is an ordinary one granted under the police power and
revocable without due process or whether it is a more valuable privilege to which constitutional protection attaches when it is granted.
The revocation of a liquor or dance hall license without notice or
hearing would not violate due process because these business activities
are deemed by the courts to be mere privileges granted under the
police power of the state.' On the other hand, the courts have granted
legal protection to the privileges of practicing the medical or legal
professions once license is granted. In Francisco v. Board of Dental
Examiners,' involving the revocation of a dentist's license, the court
held that the privilege to practice once acquired is a valuable "right"
and is entitled to protection under due process.
Some jurisdictions have placed cigarettes in the same category as
liquor on the basis that both are regulated under the police power
of the state for the health, safety, and welfare of the public.' In
Texas, however, the regulation of cigarettes is deemed an exercise
of the tax power of the state rather than the police power.' The court
reasoned that a distributor of cigarettes is not much different from
a dentist in that both have invested money in their businesses, and if
their licenses are revoked, each must turn to some other occupation.
Accordingly, the court decided that a permit to sell cigarettes "is a
privilege which does not have to be granted; however, once it is
granted it cannot be taken away except for good cause."'"
Apparently, the courts in Texas will continue to follow the majority rule that a privilege which is regulated due to the need for the
protection of the public under the police power is not entitled to
constitutional due process of law. But the courts will grant legal
protection to certain privileges that they designate to be valuable
"rights" once the privileges have been granted. The privilege of
selling cigarettes in Texas now demands due process of law before
revocation, merely because the court has deemed this activity to be
a valuable "right" (privilege). The distinction made between various
types of activities has been criticized as being extremely unfair."
'Baldacchi v. Goodlet, 145 S.W. 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error ref. See cases cited
in Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1067 (1954).
149 S.W.2d at 622.
'Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 243 (1900); Walker v. City of Clinton, 59 N.W.2d
785 (Iowa 1953).
'See Harris v. Shepperd, 156 Tex. 18, 291 S.W.2d 721 (1956). Also Tex. Tax-Gen.
Ann. art. 7.41 (1959) states that it was intended by the legislature for the regulation of
cigarettes to be an excise or use tax.
0 394 S.W.2d at 657.
" See Comment, The Use and Misuse of the Right-Privilege Distinction in License Revocation: What's So Hot About Cosmetology Schools?, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 577 (1964).
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Regardless of how much capital a licensee might have invested in his
business, his permit to carry on his operations may be revoked at any
time without notice or hearing depending on whether his occupation
has been classified by the courts as an ordinary privilege or a valuable
"right." It is somewhat disturbing to note that both a liquor license
and a license to practice medicine or law are privileges granted under
the police power of the state, yet the latter, through some unintelligible principle, has been moved by the courts to the position of a
valuable "right." The court in the instant case expressed it well when
in comparing dentistry to the occupation of selling cigarettes stated
that "To draw the line here on the basis of whether one is practicing
a profession would seem somewhat arbitrary and unjust."'" The better
rule, accepted in at least one jurisdiction," is that the doctrine of
privilege should be abandoned and all licensees afforded notification
and hearing before revocation of their licenses.
M.M.B.

Antitrust -

Clayton Act Section 5(b) Petroleum Corp.

Leh v. General

In 1956 petitioners filed an action seeking damages from General
Petroleum Corp. for violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. Defendants maintained that the suit was barred by the California one-year statute of limitations. It was admitted that the cause
of action had accrued no later than 1954, and that the four-year
limitation period created by Clayton Act section 4B did not apply
as that section was not passed until 195 5. Petitioners contended that,
because of an antitrust action brought by the United States in 1950
and still pending in 1956, Clayton Act section 5 (b) had tolled the
running of limitations. Section 5 (b) provides that during the pendency of an action instituted by the United States the statute of
limitations will be suspended in respect to private actions "based in
whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding."'
The district court dismissed the complaint on the basis of the one-year
statute, and stated that Clayton section 5 (b) did not apply because
"
'a

394 S.W.2d at 657.
Irvine v. State Board of Equalization, 40 Cal. App. 2d 280, 104 P.2d 847 (1940).

15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1964).
215 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1964).
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there was not sufficient similarity between petitioner's action and that
brought by the United States.' The Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit affirmed.4 Held, reversed: Section 5 (b) will toll the statute
of limitations if "reliance upon the government proceeding is not

mere sham and that the matters complained of in the government
suit bear a real relation to the private plaintiff's claim for relief."'
Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54 (1965).
This decision resolves a conflict among the circuits. Previously, the

Ninth Circuit, in Steiner v. 20th Century Fox Film Corp.,' had
given section 5 (b) a narrow construction, analogizing it to the,
collateral estoppel principles used in section 5 (a). Steiner states that
"greater similarity is needed than that the same conspiracies are
alleged. The same means must be used to achieve the same objectives
of the same conspiracies by the same defendants." 7 The Tenth Circuit

in Union Carbide & Carbon Corporation v. Nisley8 had decided that
"substantial identity of subject matter" was all that is needed to make
section 5 (b) apply.
Leh presented an ideal fact pattern to resolve this conflict. The
United States action was based on an alleged violation occuring between 1936 and 1950. Leh's complaint used a period from 1948 to
1954. The defendants named in each suit were drawn from the same
group of oil companies and were substantially identical. However,
Leh did not name Shell Oil Company or the Conservation Committee
of California Oil Producers in his group of defendants, and did name
Olympic Oil Company. The United States had included Shell and
the Committee, but had excluded Olympic. Noting that Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood' had damaged the foundations of the Steiner decision, and quoting extensively from Minnesota,
the Supreme Court interpreted section 5(b) broadly and found
sufficient identity of parties and actions.
The Minnesota case clearly foreshadowed the decision in Leh. The
question presented in Minnesota was whether proceedings by the
Federal Trade Commission tolled the running of limitations to the
same extent as judicial proceedings. The Court found that, "the §
5(b) advantages flow as naturally from Commission proceedings
as they do from Justice Department actions."" The opinion con'Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 208 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
'Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 330 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1964).
'Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965).
6232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956).
7
Id. at 196.
8300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962).
9381 U.S. 311 (1965).
10
Id.at 320.
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tained a comprehensive discussion of the purposes and effects of
section 5 (b), however, the requisite degree of identity of parties and
causes of action was not settled. The Leh opinion answers this question and provides the elastic standard "that the matters complained
of in the government suit bear a real relation to the private plaintiff's
claim for relief.""

J.M.W.

Constitutional Law Press -

Freedom of Speech and of the

Times Rule Extended to "Public Men"

According to press releases, Plaintiff, Maj. General Edwin A.
Walker had led a charge of rioters against United States Marshals who
were carrying out orders to integrate the University of Mississippi
campus. Plaintiff filed this action for libel in the sum of two million
dollars against defendants, Courier-Journal, Louisville Times Company, and WHAS, Inc. The court treated the factual allegations as
true for the purpose of passing upon a motion to dismiss. Held: The
New York Times rule, that the Constitution limits punishment
for defamation of a public official in the conduct of his duties to
statement proved to be knowingly or recklessly false, extends to
"public men" in situations of national concern. The actual malicei.e., knowing or reckless falsehood, necessary for punishment under
the Times rule was not shown to exist on the part of the publishers.
Walker v. Courier-Journal,- F. Supp. - (W.D.Ky. 1965).
The district court stated that the New York Times case created
federal standards in matters of "grave national concern" involving
public officials.' A situation involving integration has been classified
by the Supreme Court as a matter of national concern, in fact,

one of the "major political issues of our time."' The district court

felt that in such a case extension of the Times rule to "public men"
is justified by the language of the New York Times decision. In that
case, the Supreme Court quoted with approval Coleman v. McLennan'
inwhich a Kansas court said, "This privilege extends to a great variety
,'Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 382 U.S. 54, 59 (1965).
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). As to whether that case specifically
limited the rule to matters of grave national concern see Note, 19 Sw. L.J. 399, 407 (1965).
F. Supp. (W.D. Ky. 1965).
aWalker v. Courier-Journal, 378 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
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of subjects and includes matters of public concern, public men and
candidates for office." Furthermore, in a footnote the Court stated,
"We have no occasion here . . . to specify categories or persons who
would or would not be included."5 From these statements, the district court felt justified in concluding:
[T]he Supreme Court of the United States has served clear notice that
the broad Constitutional protections afforded by the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not be limited to "public officials" only, for
to have any meaning the protections must be extended to other categories of individuals or persons involved in the area of public debate
or who have become involved in matters of public concern.'

After taking judicial notice of the fact that plaintiff's public life
is well known nationally, the court mentioned vague qualifications
in determining the existence of "public men":
Public debate cannot be "uninhibited, robust and wide open" if the
news media are compelled to stand legally in awe of error in reporting
the words, and actions of persons of national prominence and influence
(not 'public officials') who are nevertheless voluntarily injecting themselves into matters of grave public concern attempting thereby through
use of their leadership and influence, to mold public thought and opinion
to their own way of thinking.!

The court felt that plaintiff had reasonably foreseen that his personal
status would be interwoven into that of a "public one whereby he

would become the subject of substantial press, radio and television
news comment, thus magnifying the chance that his activities would
be 'erroneously' reported. . . . Public men are, as it were, public

property. '8
In finding that malice did not exist under the extended rule, the
court mentioned only the vaguest of guidelines for determining
actual malice:
Everyone knows that news of any matter of public concern possesses
a limited lifetime, for to be news it must be published with promptness
and dispatch in order that the public be kept informed as to the actions
of "public men." This Court is of the opinion that the Defendants
(reasonably) had the right to rely upon the reputable national news
sources.0
4376 U.S. 254, 281-82 (1964).
'Walker v. Courier-Journal, -

(Emphasis added.)
F. Supp. (1965).

Ibid. As to the test of "matters of public concern" see Pedrick, Freedom of the Press

and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 Cornell L. Q. 581, 592 (1964);
Note, 9 Vill. L. Rev. 534, 538 (1964). See also Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 355 F.2d
659, 671 (2d Cir. 1964); and Note, 19 Sw. L.J. 399, 407 (1965).
'Ibid. For the language "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" see New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 262 (1964).
'Ibid. See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964).
8

Ibid.
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Universality of the publication clearly negatives the possible attribution of "actual malice" to any single publisher.
The decision is vastly important in that it extends the Times rule,
which had been limited in scope to an area of libel seldom litigated,1 °
to one that is much more significant and sweeping in scope. Because
suits by General Walker are pending against the Associated Press in
Texas, Colorado, Louisiana and Mississippi; against newspapers in
Texas, Louisiana, Georgia, Florida, Missouri, Colorado, and Wisconsin; and against Newsweek Magazine in Oklahoma, it seems certain that the Supreme Court will soon be confronted with the
question of extension. If the Court extends the rule to "public men,""
it would be desirable that it also establish specific standards for determining when an individual becomes a "public man" or what statements amount to "actual malice." The vague allusions to such
standards by the district court are insufficient as guidelines for trial
courts to follow.
G.B.R.

Corporations -Beneficial

Owner of Stock Allowed

to Inspect Corporation's Books
In a division of community property upon divorce, the judgment
gave the wife a beneficial interest in ten per cent of the stock of
defendant corporation. The remaining ninety per cent was vested
in the husband subject to a lien. All of the stock was placed in trust,
with the husband having the right to vote it. The judgment provided
that the wife had no legal concern as to whether dividends were paid,
and "she was restricted to receipt of her part of any dividends declared or the proceeds of sale and that she should not have the right
to question the propriety of management or have any other minority
stockholder right.

.

."'

The wife sought a writ of mandamus order-

ing the corporation to allow her to inspect its books. Defendant
asserted that under article 2.44 of the Texas Business Corporation
Act the wife was not a stockholder "of record" and therefore she was
"°Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 873,

893

(1949).
11For the use of the term "public figure" in this connection see Note, 48 Marq. L. Rev.
128, 133 (1964); and Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 201, 204 (1964).
'Texas

Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Erwin, 397 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
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not entitled to inspect the books. The trial court granted mandamus.
Held, affirmed: The holder of a beneficial interest in stock has a right
at common law, upon application to a court of competent jurisdiction
and proof of a proper purpose, to inspect the company's books. Texas
Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Erwin, 497 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965).
Article 2.44B of the Texas Business Corporation Act, entitled
"Books and Records," reads in part as follows:
Any person who shall have been a shareholder of record for at least
six (6) months immediately preceding his demand, or who shall be
the holder of record of at least five per cent (5 %) of all the outstanding shares of a corporation, upon written demand stating the purpose
thereof, shall have the right to examine ...

its books....

This section clearly indicates that the person wishing to inspect the
books must be a shareholder "of record." The court in Texas InfraRed Radiant Co. did not rely on section B, but on a common law
right that was supposedly preserved by section C. The decision
states, "Section C was intended to make it clear that a shareholder's
right of examination under the common-law was not restricted by
said statute."'
Nothing herein contained shall impair the power of any court of competent jurisdiction, upon proof by a shareholder of proper purpose,
irrespective of the period of time during which such shareholder shall
have been a shareholder of record, and irrespective of the number of
shares held by him, to compel the production, for examination by such
shareholder, of the books and records of account, minutes, and record of
shareholders of a corporation.
From the wording of section C it is difficult to determine if the
courts are entitled to disregard the "of record" requirement. Obviously both the time and percentage of ownership requirements can
be ignored. As this portion of the Texas Act is identical to the Model
Act,' and there are many decisions in other states interpreting the
section as intending to preserve the common law right, there can be
little doubt that such a right exists.' However, does it extend to
beneficial owners?
No previous authority in Texas, allowing a beneficial owner of
stock the right to inspect the company's books, can be found. However, the decision in Texas Infra-Red Radiant Co. appears to be sound.
2 Id. at 493.

a The wording of section C is exactly the same as a portion of section 46 of the Model
Business Corporation Act.
'Bishop's Estate v. Antilles Enterprises, Inc., 252 F.2d 498 (3d Cir. 1958), and In re
Bush Terminal Co., 78 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1935).
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The pre-requisites for allowance of the common law right are ample
protection for the corporation. The decision to permit inspection must
be made by a court of competent jurisdiction after the showing of
a "proper" purpose by the demandant. At the same time, a beneficial
owner has a real interest in the management of the corporation, and
should be given access to the corporate books and records.'
J.M.W.

Criminal Law - Failure to Notify Defendant of Right
to Assistance of Counsel in Misdemeanor Case Invalidates Plea of Guilty
Defendant was convicted in a county court of Florida for the
misdemeanors of illegal sale and illegal possession of liquor, and, upon
each count, she was sentenced to serve six months in the county jail
or to pay a fine of $250. Following her incarceration defendant
sought to withdraw her pleas of guilty and made a motion for a new
trial on the grounds that she was without counsel at the time of her
arraignment, that she was indigent and unable to employ counsel,
and that she was not advised by the court of her right to counsel.
Upon denial of her motions, defendant filed application for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States district court.1 The court denied
defendant's habeas corpus application and defendant appealed. Held,
reversed: Failure to notify the defendant of her right to the assistance
of counsel rendered the plea of guilty and the judgment of conviction and sentence constitutionally invalid, notwithstanding the fact
that both counts upon which defendant was sentenced were misdemeanors. McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965).
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Harvey v. Mississippi? marked the
first time that a federal court had ruled that an indigent defendant
in a misdemeanor case was denied due process of law in a state court
if he was not notified of his right to the assistance of court-appointed
' This decision would also affect Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.30B (1956), concerning voting agreement copies deposited with the corporation. See Comment, 12 Sw. L.J. 61,
72 (1958).
' The district court held that state remedies, by reason of a Florida Supreme Court decision, had been pursued to an extent sufficient to warrant application for federal relief.
In Fish v. State, 159 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1964), the court held that Gideon applied only to
felony cases.
a 3 4 0 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965). See Comment, 19 Sw. L.J. 593 (1965).
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counsel. In the instant case, the court observes that "under Gideon,
states must now provide counsel for indigent defendants in criminal
cases to the same extent as the United States, under like circumstances, must [provide] ...in Federal cases."' The federal standard
is codified in the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 which provides that
in cases of petty offenses, an indigent defendant may be denied assistance of counsel, but the appointment of counsel is required in cases
of all other crimes.4 A petty offense is defined as one for which the
penalty does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or
a fine of not more than $500, or both. While the court notes that
it is without authority to announce a petty offense rule which would
be controlling in state proceedings, it acknowledges that "such a
rule would provide a rule of certainty and one which might be fair
in most situations although it would be difficult to sustain on any
legal ground."' In this connection, it is interesting to note that had
the Harvey case been a federal prosecution, the offense with which
Harvey was charged would have been a petty offense.'
The court indicates that they would not extend the right to counsel
to a person in a municipal court charged with being drunk and disorderly, and that they would be even less likely to extend the right
to a person given a ticket for a traffic violation. The rationale for
this position is founded upon the great burden which would be placed
upon the bar. While the court apparently favors following what
Congress has deemed the federal standard, i.e., providing courtappointed counsel for indigents accused of misdemeanors other than
petty offenses, the Harvey decision would indicate that the constitutional standard extends beyond this line. This much seems clear:
the constitution requires state courts to provide court-appointed
counsel whenever the gravity of the offense exceeds that of a federal
misdemeanor. How far beyond that line the courts are willing to go
must await subsequent determination.
C.W.M.

'McDonald

v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106, 108 (5th Cir. 1965).
as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
5 18 U.S.C. 5 1 (1958).
6McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d at 109, n.4 (sth Cir. 1965).

478 Stat. 552 (1964),

Harvey was charged with possession of whiskey, a misdemeanor in Mississippi, punishable by a fine of un to $500 and up to ninety days in jail.
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-

Legitimation of Children of Annulled

Plaintiff, the father, instituted suit to determine custodial and
other rights in his child conceived prior to marriage and born after
annulment of the marriage. He and the mother had been ceremonially
married, at which time the mother was pregnant with the child.
After living together for a short time, the expectant mother left
plaintiff and sought an annulment of the marriage. Plaintiff consented to the annulment upon assurance from the mother that she
would relinquish the child into his custody. Judgment annulling the
marriage became final prior to the birth of the child. After judgment the mother disappeared. When plaintiff finally located the
mother, he discovered that the child had been judicially declared
neglected and had been placed with an adoption agency. Plaintiff
consulted with the agency regarding the child's identity and location. However, the agency refused to give plaintiff any information,
claiming that plaintiff had no rights in the child. The trial court
rendered summary judgment for the defendant agency but the court
of civil appeals reversed and defendant agency appealed. Held,
affirmed: The child was legitimated upon the marriage of the parents and could not be bastardized merely because marriage was dissolved by annulment rather than by divorce. Home of the Holy
Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1965).
Under Texas law, unless the child is legitimate, the father is under
no duty of support' nor is his consent necessary to adoption Therefore, without the correlative responsibilities, the father has no custodial or other rights in his child merely by virtue of being the
father.' However, the legal relationship existing between a father
and his child, subsequently legitimated by statute, should be the same
as that of a father and his legitimate child.4
Section 42 of the Probate Code provides the statutory basis upon
which a child is legitimated in Texas.' The statute was construed in
James v. James,' where the court indicated that the Texas Legislature
'See Lane v. Phillips, 69 Tex. 240, 6 S.W. 610 (1887); Beaver v. State, 96 Tex. Crim.
179, 256 S.W. 929 (1923).
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 46a (1959).
Timmins v. Lacy, 30 Tex. 116 (1867); Cleaver v. Johnson, 212 S.W.2d 197 (Tex.

'See

Civ.4 App. 1948).
Henderson v. Henderson, 187 Va. 121, 46 S.E.2d 10 (1948).
'Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 42 (1956) "Where a man, having by a woman a child or
children shall afterwards intermarry with such woman, such child or children shall thereby
be legitimated and made capable of inheriting his estate."
6253 S.W. 1112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) error ref.
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intended the statute to provide for full legitimation and concluded
that upon the marriage of the parents their child previously born
was legitimated for all purposes. In the instant case, the child was
born after annulment of the marriage rather than prior to the marriage as in James. However, the court relied upon an earlier decision 7
and held that the statute operated whenever a valid marriage occurred
after conception of the child.
The defendant agency, in the principal case, argued that the statute
did not apply because the marriage was annulled. It reasoned that
an annulment places the parties in the same position as if they had
never married,8 and, as a consequence, would deprive the child of
its legitimate status. The court, however, concluded that the legitimation statute was enacted for the humane purpose of avoiding the
stigma of illegitimacy and should be liberally construed to effectuate
that purpose. Therefore, even though the annulment decree may
relate back to the time of the marriage as between the parties to the
annulment, the decree will not be given that effect regarding the
legitimacy of their child. The court made it clear that merely because the law had created a fiction concerning a voidable marriage
that such fiction would not lead to an unjust result respecting the
rights of a third party. The legitimacy of a child of an annulled
marriage is an exception to the theory that the marriage is void

ab initio.
J.W.B.

Federal Venue - Transfer Under Section 1404(a)
The plaintiffs filed suit in the federal district court of Louisiana
for wrongful death resulting from the crash of petitioner's helicopter
off the Louisiana coast. Petitioner, Cessna Aircraft, answered, alleging
that it was not amenable to process in Louisiana. In order to prevent
the running of the statute of limitations in the event the Louisiana
court lacked jurisdiction, plaintiffs then filed a similar suit in the

Kansas federal district court which concededly had jurisdiction. However, before the Kansas suit proceeded to trial, the Louisiana court
held that it possessed jurisdiction over Cessna, and plaintiffs moved
'Gravley v. Gravley, 353 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961)
'Garcia v. Garcia, 232 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).

error dism.
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the Kansas court for a transfer to the Louisiana court under 28
U.S.C. section 1404 (a).'

The Kansas court granted the transfer, finding that both the convenience of parties and witnesses and the interests of justice required
the change of venue. It held that the statutory requirement that a
transfer be made only to a court where the action "might have been
brought" was satisfied by the decision of the federal court in Louisiana that it had jurisdiction over Cessna. Cessna applied to the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit for writ of mandamus to prevent
the transfer. Held, writ granted: The transfer should be prevented
to avoid complications which might result from an ultimate holding
that Louisiana is without jurisdiction, and the Kansas proceeding must
be stayed pending the termination of the litigation in Louisiana.
Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Brown, 348 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1965).
The scope of review on petition for writ of mandamus to prevent
a section 1404 (a) transfer is limited to the questions (1) whether the
district court had power to make the transfer, i.e., whether the transferee district is one where the action might have been brought and
(2) in some federal circuits, whether the district judge abused his
discretion in allowing the transfer.! However, in the instant case,
the court did not base its decision on either of the above grounds.
Ordinarily, a district is one where the action "might have been
brought" if subject matter jurisdiction, venue, and service of process
are proper there.' The transferor court determines whether these
requisites are satisfied, and the court of appeals for the transferor
circuit should mandamus the lower court only if it finds that determination to be erroneous.4 Nevertheless, in the principle case, the
court of appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued the writ to prevent the
transfer even though it did not find error in the district judge's determination that the suit might have been brought in Louisiana. The
court felt that the transfer should not be made in order to avoid
complications which might result if the Fifth Circuit overuled the
Louisiana district court on the jurisdictional issue. On first impression
this would seem to be a clear usurpation of appellate authority in
violation of section 1404(a). That statute provides that "a district
court may transfer .

. . ."

if specified requisites are satisfied, and the

1 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
' I Moore, Federal Practice § 0.145 [6.-1] (2d ed. 1962).
'Id. § 0.147.
'See Ackert v. Pelt Bryan, 290 F.2d 65 (1962).
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Tenth Circuit made no finding that the statutory requirements had
not been met.
A significant factor in the principle case is that the Louisiana court
had acquired jurisdiction of a similar action before the Kansas proceeding was instituted. The court of appeals, mindful of its duty to
prevent multiple litigation, invoked the familiar rule of comity that
"the first federal district court which contains jurisdiction of parties
and issues should have priority, and the second court should decline
consideration of the action until proceedings before the first court
are terminated."' By invoking this rule, the court assumed that it
could properly prevent the transfer even though no finding was
made that the district judge had wrongly applied the statutory
criteria. But unless an appellate court should find within the limited
scope of its review of a section 1404 (a) transfer that the statutory
requisites were not satisfied, it would seem that the transfer order
should stand. A subsequent direction to stay the proceedings should
have no effect on a transfer order which was properly granted under
section 1404 (a).
The court might have supported the writ on grounds that the
district judge had abused his discretion by ordering a transfer in the
face of a paramount duty to stay the proceedings in deference to
the Louisiana litigation. Under such circumstances a transfer might
not be "in the interest of justice."' This rationale would have accomplished the court's purpose in a manner consistent with both
precedent and statute.
But the court's opinion seems to indicate that mandamus is proper
without regard to the propriety of the district judge's action under
section1404 (a) if the writ is issued to promote "sound judicial administration." This proposition purports to enlarge the scope of review of federal transfer orders to an extent not contemplated by
section 1404 (a).
E.L.Y.

Insurance -Extended
owned Vehicles

Coverage To Drivers Of Non-

Appellee McCarty was struck and injured by a United States Air

5348 F.2d 689, 692
F.2d 43 (1961).
6 See note 1 supra.

(1965),

citing National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287
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Force pickup truck driven by Mrs. Purser, a civilian. Mrs. Purser
was accompanied by Lt. Col. Jewell, the officer to whom the truck
had been assigned by the Air Force. An insurance policy on her own
car extended coverage to her in a non-owned vehicle, providing she
had the owner's consent to drive it. Jewell, upon whose permission
she relied, was forbidden by statute' to authorize non-official use of
the vehicle. McCarty obtained a judgment against Purser2 but her
insurer refused to pay alleging that the truck was driven without the
permission of its owner, the United States Government. The trial
court entered judgment against the insurer, and it appealed. The
issue in the court of civil appeals was whether Purser had the owner's
consent, within the meaning of the insurance policy, to drive the
truck. Held, affirmed: A person driving a non-owned vehicle is
covered by his own insurance policy when he reasonably believes
that he has the consent of the owner to use the vehicle. American
Surety Co. v. McCarty, 395 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
The controlling question in the instant case was whether Mrs. Purser could rely on Jewell's authority to allow her to drive the pickup.
Jewell testified that the truck was assigned to him on a twenty-four
hour basis. As an agent of the owner, Jewell presumably could freely
authorize use of the truck. In fact, non-official use of the truck was
prohibited by statute. However, Mrs. Purser was not charged with
knowledge of the statute since it was directed to the conduct of
official personnel. Mrs. Purser had no reason to question Jewell's
authority and had every right to believe that her own policy would
extend its coverage to her as she drove the truck. If Mrs. Purser's
belief was reasonable, her insurance company could not assert a contrary position.
Two situations must be distinguished. If a negligent driver is seeking extended coverage from the owner's policy, the critical determination is whether the driver in fact had the consent of the owner to
drive the car.' This permission may be express or implied, or given
by an agent who has actual authority to do so. On the other hand,
when the driver looks to his own insurance policy for extended
coverage when he is operating a non-owned vehicle, the issue is
whether the driver had a right to believe that he was using the vehicle
with the owner's consent.
A.D.S.
'60 Stat. 810, 5 U.S.C. § 78(c)(2) (1964).
'McCarty v. Purser, 379 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. 1964).
'As the court indicates, the driver acts at his peril when he relies upon the owner's
policy for coverage. Id. at 667. Cf. Globe Indemnity Co. v. French, 382 S.W.2d 771 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.r.e.
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Rules of Construction

Suit was brought by the payee for recovery on a ninety-day
promissory note. Defendant had executed the note on a printed form
provided by the payee. The amount of the obligation appeared in one
place as the figure, $5,780, and in another place, written out as five
thousand eighty dollars. In addition to the unconditional promise to
pay printed on the form, the note contained a handwritten clause
providing that the maker would make $1,000 overpayments on
future deliveries until the obligation of the note was paid. In the
trial court, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in
the amount of $5,780. Held, reversed: Where there is a variance between the written words and the figures in a non-negotiable note,
the written words control as a matter of law. Guthrie v. National
Homes Corp., 394 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1965).
The court found that the clause providing for overpayments on
future deliveries burdened the note with conditions of an extrinsic
agreement and rendered it non-negotiable.' Thus the instrument under consideration was nothing more than a simple contract and
should have been interpreted according to the rules of construction
for contracts. The objective of the contract rules of construction is
to determine and enforce the intent of the parties.! In the instant
case, the variance between the written words and the printed figures
constituted a patent ambiquity.' Such an ambiquity can be resolved
by resort to parol evidence in an action for reformation. As Justice
Griffin noted in the dissent, "Equity grants relief where, as a result
of a mistake by the parties in an effort to reduce their agreement to
writing, the subsequent contract does not express their real agreement ....
The court in the instant case applied a rule of construction for
negotiable instruments law, which is intended to aid the free flow of
commercial paper. The rules of construction embodied in the Negotiable Instrument Act' are designed to achieve this purpose by allowing construction of ambiguities on the face of negotiable instruments
as a matter of law. The application of these rules of construction to
non-negotiable paper is not justified by commercial necessity and is an
1 394 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex. 1965).

'Williston, Contracts § 600 (3d ed. 1961).
a A patent ambiguity involves a lack of certainty that is apparent on the face of the
instrument. See 23 Tex. Jur. 2d Evidence § 351 (1961).
4394 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. 1965).
' Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5932 § 17 (1962). The provisions of article 17 have been
substantially incorporated into article 3-118 of the Uniform Commercial Code, enacted by
the 59th legislature to become effective July 1, 1966.
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injustice to the parties who should be permitted to enforce the written
contract in accordance with their actual agreement.
J.D.T.

Oil and Gas

Interest as Cost in Accounting to Nonconsenting Cotenant.
-

Davison and others, the respondents, owned 28/32 of a 13/16
working interest in a lease. Petitioners owned a 3/32 mineral interest
in the same land. Respondents wished to drill for minerals, but petitioners refused to join in the proposed venture. Nevertheless, respondents drilled producing wells on the common property at their
own expense. In accounting to the petitioners for their portion of
the production, the respondents deducted as a development cost the
interest on the non-consenting cotenants share of the drilling expenses. The trial court held that interest was a reasonable development cost, and the the court of appeals affirmed. Held, reversed:
Interest charges are not a part of the reasonable costs of production
and may not be recovered from a non-consenting cotenant. Cox v.
Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1965).
A cotenant acting in good faith may develop the common property
without having secured the consent of his cotenants, but if the
minerals are produced the operating cotenant must make an accounting to the non-consenting and non-paying cotenants for their share
of the production.1 The operator is entitled to be reimbursed from the
production for the non-joining cotenants' share of the reasonable
and necessary cost of development, production, and marketing.2
However, if a cotenant does not consent to the development of the
mineral estate, his proportionate share of the financing charges is
not a reasonable and necessary cost of development. The same is true
whether the operating cotenant uses his own funds or pays interest
on borrowed money.'
' Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tex. 1965). See also, Kuntz, 1 Oil and Gas §
5.6, at 113 (1962); Masterson, A 1952 Survey of Basic Oil and Gas Law, 6 Sw. L.J. 1, 29
(1952). At least three states do not permit a cotenant to produce common minerals without
the consent of the other owners: Illinois, Ziegler v. Brenneman, 237 Ill. 15, 86 N.E. 597
(1908); Louisiana, Gulf Refining Co. v. Carroll, 145 La. 299, 82 So. 277 (1919); West
Virginia, Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562; 27 S.E. 411 (1897).
2 The burden is upon the operating cotenant to prove the expense is reasonable and
necessary. Johnson v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 90 Kan. 565, 135 P. 589 (1913). Once a
cost is established, however, it may be difficult for the nonjoining cotenant to gather sufficient information to challenge the method of bookkeeping or the amount allegedly expended.
a 397 S.W.2d at 202.
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The majority of the court stated that interest was an incident of
debt. Since the non-consenting cotenants' obligation to the operator
was not in the nature of a debt, the court reasoned that interest
could not be a reasonable cost. Justice Pope, dissenting,4 said that
the issue was not whether a debt existed, but whether interest was a
reasonable and necessary cost of development. Logically, interest paid
on money borrowed to finance the development of common minerals
is a cost of production, while an interest charge founded upon the
use of a cotenant's own funds appears to be in the nature of a debt,
at least when applied to a development of common minerals undertaken without the consent of the other cotenants.
J.B.H.

Taxation - Patent Transfer Under Section 1235Related Persons
The inventor of a bath oil formula sought to interest two business
associates (taxpayers) in the formula which he had conceived but
had not begun to develop. The proposal was accepted, and a onethird interest in the formula was transferred to each of the two taxpayers in consideration for their agreement to finance all of the development costs. Following successful development of the formula,
the two taxpayers, in an arm's-length transaction, transferred their
interests in the formula to a manufacturing partnership consisting
of the inventor of the formula and the wives of the two taxpayers.
The taxpayer-husbands and the inventor received a royalty on net
sales in consideration for the transfer of their interest in the formula
to the partnership. In 1958 the taxpayer-husbands each received payments of $19,484.33 pursuant to this arrangement. This amount was
reported as a long-term capital gain under section 12351 of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides that a transfer of all substantial
rights to a patent, or an undivided interest therein, by a holder to
transferees other than related persons shall be treated as if it were
a sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than six months.
The Commissioner assessed a deficiency, asserting that the transfer
was between related persons, and that the royalty payments should
4 397 S.W.2d at 204.

'lit.

Rev. Code of 1954, § 1235.
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therefore be taxed as ordinary income. The Tax Court' sustained the
Commissioner and the taxpayers appealed. Held, affirmed: A transfer
of a patent between two partnerships, eighty per cent owned by the
same or related interests, is a transfer between related persons and the
consideration received for the transfer is ordinary income. Burde v.
Commissioner, 352 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1965).
Section 1235 (d)a provides that capital gains treatment shall not
apply to a transfer of a patent between persons specified in section
267(b).' The congressional intent of 1235(d) was to prevent the
conversion of ordinary income into capital gains by a transfer of a
patent within essentially the same economic group.' However, section
276(b) makes no mention of a partnership as a related person. To
establish when a transfer to a partnership constitutes a transfer within
the same economic group, the court looks to the "controlled partnership" provisions of section 707 (b).' Section 707 recognizes the partnership as a separate entity in transactions between a partner and the
partnership except when a sale or exchange of property occurs between a partnership and a partner, or between two partnerships in
which the same persons own directly or indirectly eighty per cent
of the interest therein. As section 707 (b) and section 1235 (d) were
both7 designed to prevent capital gains treatment between transfers
within the same economic group, the court applied the eighty per cent
test of section 707 to the instant transaction to determine whether a
partnership is to be treated as an entity for purposes of the patent
transfer. The court found that the original undertaking to develop
the patent to commercial production by the inventor and the two
taxpayer-husbands constituted a joint venture,8 and that the transfer
to the partnership composed of the inventor and the wives therefore
243 T.C. 252 (1964).

'Related Persons.-Subsection (a) shall not apply to any transfer, directly or indirectly,
between persons specified within any one of the paragraphs of section 267(b); except that,
in applying section 267(b) and (c) for purposes of this section(1) the phrase "25 percent or more" shall be substituted for the phrase "more
than 50 percent" each place it appears in section 267(b), and
(2) paragraph (4) of section 267(c) shall be treated as providing that the
family of an individual shall include only his spouse, ancestors, and lineal
descendants.
4 int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 267(b).
5
H. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A280-A281 (1954).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 707(b).
7As
to § 1235(d), see House Report, note 5 supra. As to § 707, see S. Rep. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1954), U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, p. 4629.
8Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (1) states:
The term "partnership" is broader in scope than the common law meaning
. . . Mere co-ownership of property which is maintained, kept in repair, and
leased does not constitute a partnership. . . . Tenants in common, however,
may be partners if they actively carry on a trade, business, financial operation,
or venture and divide the profits thereof.
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was a transfer between two partnerships eighty per cent owned by the
same or related interests. By thus falling within the literal terms of
section 707(b) (2) (B), the transferee partnership was held to be a
related person pursuant to section 1235 (d), and the royalty payments received in 1958 were, therefore, taxable as ordinary income.
Treating the partnership as an unrelated entity for purposes of
section 1235 when it has filtered through the section 707 sieve can
give rise to various tax benefits. It the holding of the instant case is
to be consistently applied, the partnership form offers many advantages over the corporate form when transferring a patent to an
entity in which the transferor has an interest. Section 1235 (d) disqualifies transfers of patents to corporations from capital gains treatment when twenty-five per cent or more of the corporation is owned
by the transferor.' At the same time, if the transfer is to a partnership, the transferor may own as much as seventy-nine per cent of the
transferee before losing the tax benefit. As apparently no good purpose of tax policy is served by permitting capital gains treatment for
a patent transferred to a partnership when less than eighty per cent
is owned by the transferor when the same transfer to a corporation
owned to the extent of twenty-five per cent or more by the transferee
will be subject to ordinary income treatment, remedial legislation
would seem warranted.
C.W.M.

Taxation
Purpose

-

Reorganizations -

No Tax Avoidance

In 1958 Wilson's Furniture, Inc. spun-off a corporation which
was called Wil-Plan. In the transaction Wil-Plan received an automobile and a number of conditional sales contracts that had been
previously obtained by Wilson's, Inc. through the sale of furniture
on deferred payment plans. All of the stock in Wil-Plan was distributed to the two taxpayers, the owners of Wilson's, Inc. At the
time of the transfer Wilson's, Inc. had accumulated earnings and
profits of $48,889.98. The Wil-Plan stock had a fair market value of
$69,020.07. The two taxpayers did not include any income attributable to the Wil-Plan stock in their tax returns for 1958 on the ground
'See note 3 supra.
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that the spin-off was non-taxable under section 355.2 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue asserted a deficiency of $11,000 against
each of them. The Tax Court found that while there was no valid
business purpose for the spin-off, there also was no tax avoidance
purpose, and held for the taxpayers.! The Commissioner appealed.
Held, reversed: A valid business purpose is required for a tax free
spin-off under section 355. The lack of a tax avoidance motive will
not protect the transfer. Commissioner v. Wilson, 355 F.2d 184 (9th
Cir. 1965).
Section 355 contains a prohibition against using spin-offs as a
"device for the distribution of the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation or the controlled corporation."' Usually when
a corporation distributes assets to its stockholders or sells assets and
distributes the proceeds, a dividend results, and the stockholders must
pay tax at ordinary income rates. However, if the corporation. is
permitted to transfer the assets to a new corporation and distribute
the new company's shares to its (the old company's) stockholders
in a tax-free spin-off, the stockholders could either liquidate the new
corporation or sell its stock, thereby realizing capital gains. Section
355 is intended to prevent this. In addition to the specific requirements of section 355, the test provided by Gregory v. Helvering4
must be met. The Gregory case is often cited as requiring "a valid
business purpose" to support the reorganization. In reaching the
Gregory decision the Supreme Court also found the existence of a tax
avoidance motive. From this it is possible to infer a dual test for
finding a transaction invalid-the absence of a valid business purpose
plus the presence of a tax avoidance motive.
In Wilson the court was "confronted with what may be a unique
situation, that of a corporation reorganization which had no business
reason and which had no tax avoidance purpose .

.

."'

The court

concluded that the nonexistence of a tax avoidance motive is not
controlling. It stated that "so much in the way of liability for taxes
can hardly be allowed to depend solely upon what goes on in someone's mind."' This decision clearly indicates that the requirement of
a valid business purpose, created by Gregory v. Helvering, must
be strictly applied.
J.M.W.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 355.
'Maine S. Wilson, 42 T.C. 914 (1964).
a Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 355(a) (1) (B).
4293 U.S. 465 (1935).
'Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir. 1965).
6 Ibid.
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Wills -

Probate Proceedings

-

Attorney's Fees

Raymond Salmon, the principal beneficiary and an executor of

the will of Maria Hoben, employed attorneys on a contingent fee
basis to defend the will and to seek its admission to probate. Two
sisters, who had been pretermitted from the will of the testatrix,
contested probate on the ground that all of the beneficiaries had

renounced their rights under the will in a family settlement. After
two trials and an appeal, the will was admitted to probate. The attorneys hired by Raymond filed a claim for $25,000, which was
allowed by the executors and approved by the county court. On
appeal to the district court, a jury found that $19,200 was a reasonable fee, and a judgment was entered on the verdict ordering payment of that amount. The court of civil appeals required a remittittur
of $2,200, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court as reformed.
Held, reversed: Attorney's fees allowed by section 243 of the Probate
Code' cannot be contingent upon the outcome of the litigation but
must be for a reasonable fee certain. Salmon v. Salmon, 395 S.W.2d
29 (Tex. 1965).
Section 243 authorizes a person named in the will as executor to
employ attorneys to defend the will and to prosecute actions for the
purpose of having the will admitted to probate. Prior to the enactment of this section, there was no statutory authority for the payment of attorney's fees out of an estate. The Texas courts, however,
had allowed reasonable fees when the executors, acting in good faith,
employed attorneys to seek admission of wills to probate In these
cases, the fees allowed were classified as expenses of administration,'

and were allowed whether the litigation was successful or not.' The
question of whether these fees could be contingent, however, had
never been answered. The instant case clearly answers this question
in the negative. The amount of attorney's fees to be allowed in
probate proceedings is to be determined by the reasonable value of
the services rendered and not by what might be reasonable should
the litigation prove successful.
D.E.W
1

Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 243 (1956):
When any person designated as executor in a will, or as administrator with
the will annexed, defends it or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, and
with just cause, for the purpose of having the will admitted to probate,
whether successful or not, he shall be allowed out of the estate his necessary
expenses and disbursements, including reasonable attorney's fees, in such pro2 ceedings.
Lang v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 138 Tex. 399, 159 S.W.2d 478 (1942); Huff v. Huff,
132 Tex. 540, 124 S.W.2d 327 (1939).
3Lang v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 138 Tex. 399, 159 S.W.2d 478 (1942).
4
Huff v. Huff, 132 Tex. 540, 124 S.W.2d 327 (1939).

